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Review by Erik J. Dahl, Naval Postgraduate School ordan Tama’s new book is an outstanding addition to the literature on national security reform and the role of national commissions in effecting policy change.  He takes a fresh look at a topic that hasn’t gotten enough attention, and makes the very intriguing argument that blue-ribbon commissions accomplish much more than they usually are given credit for.  Although I generally subscribe to the conventional wisdom Tama challenges, which sees national commissions as unlikely to spur policy change, I came away from the book at least partly convinced by his argument.    Tama focuses on commissions and panels that examine national security issues, and attempts to determine whether such commissions prompt significant reforms, and if so why some are more influential than others.  There are considerable methodological challenges here, beginning with the question of how one defines a commission, and one of the strengths of the book is that he addresses these challenges directly and clearly.  He defines a commission as “a temporary panel of two or more people—including at least one private citizen—created by an act of Congress or executive branch directive,” which has only advisory powers and which is mandated to produce a final report within four years (5).     To study the question of commission influence he developed a data set of 51 national security commissions that were established either by Congress or the President from 1983 to 2006.  Quibbles can be made about his selection of these commissions.  For example, he excludes the report on the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia because it was the report of one person, General Wayne Downing, rather than of a commission; but that report was actually the work of a task force led by Downing, so perhaps it should be included in Tama’s study.1   In general, however, his data set seems well developed and appropriate for this study.   Another strength of the book is that Tama approaches the problem through the use of statistical/quantitative tools as well as through qualitative, case study analysis.  He devotes a chapter to a statistical analysis of the 51 commissions in his data set, and although I do not have enough experience with quantitative analysis to fully assess his statistical chapter—especially his regression analysis—I applaud his attempt to do more than case study work.  The largest part of the book consists of three chapters containing a total of eight case studies of major commissions that investigated terrorist threats or attacks.  The case studies are well written and argued, and are especially useful because they are based on more than just the commission reports and secondary accounts: the author conducted interviews with 209 commissioners, commission staff members, and other government officials.  These interviews appear to have produced a rich, original source of material.                                                            1 Report of the Assessment of the Khobar Towers Bombing, August 30, 1996, at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/downing/report.pdf.   
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Tama finds that in many cases commissions have resulted in new legislation, produced organizational reform, or sparked other policy changes that would not have been likely otherwise.  Commissions formed after a crisis, he argues, tend to have more impact than those formed to examine issues in the absence of a crisis; and it helps when commissions have narrow mandates, they report their findings quickly and by consensus, and they establish a vigorous advocacy program to push for the reforms they recommend.  Tama’s arguments here seem solid, and the significance of these factors—especially concerning the importance of consensus and public advocacy—can be seen in the dramatic difference in the impact reached by the Congressional Joint Inquiry following the 9/11 attacks and the later 9/11 Commission.  As Tama points out, the Joint Inquiry does not actually fit his definition of a commission because it did not include any private citizens.  But the Joint Inquiry report is a good illustration of what doesn’t work with government commissions, as it was the subject of harsh dissents by some members and attracted little public support for its proposals.  It was soon overshadowed by the 9/11 Commission, which attracted a great deal of public support, reached its conclusions by consensus, and orchestrated a lengthy public relations campaign that outlived the official existence of the commission itself.    The book is an important counter to the standard view of intelligence reform commissions and panels, as seen for example in the work of Amy Zegart.2
 
  According to this view, commissions and blue ribbon panels do little to help the intelligence community learn the lessons of failures and disasters.  Zegart, for example, reviewed twelve major commissions and task forces that examined the intelligence community and counterterrorism efforts between 1991 and the 9/11 attacks, and found that although most of them came to essentially the same conclusions regarding the need for organizational reform, little was actually done.   Tama argues that when commissions are formed in the absence of a major crisis—as was the case with most of the commissions in the 1990s—they are unlikely to gain much traction.  But he also makes the case that at least some of these commissions did actually have more impact that is commonly recognized.  One example Tama cites is the Hart-Rudman Commission, which has to some extent been seen as a poster child for the way most national security commissions conduct their work: a group of respected senior officials and experts study a problem carefully, they issue a lengthy report filled with wise recommendations, and then they and their report are quickly forgotten.  Since 9/11 the Hart-Rudman Commission has been praised for having warned about the growing terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland, but has also been seen as ineffective because no one listened to what it had to say.  Tama reverses this conventional view, arguing that the Hart-Rudman Commission had a great deal of influence through putting the concept of a national homeland security agency on the public agenda.  The later establishment of the Department 
                                                        2 Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).  See also Michael Warner and J. Kenneth McDonald, US Intelligence Community 
Reform Studies Since 1947 (Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005).   
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of Homeland Security, he writes, might not have occurred had not the Hart-Rudman Commission initially floated the idea.3    The favorable treatment of the 9/11 Commission in this book is also interesting in contrast to the much less positive views expressed in recent years by experts such as Zegart, who argues that the commission’s reforms have not accomplished much, and Paul Pillar, who charges that the commission’s work was a flawed and politicized effort that served largely to blame the intelligence community for its perceived failings prior to the attacks.4    A critical aspect of Tama’s argument concerns his definition of what makes a commission successful.  Stimulating the adoption of new laws or policies is enough; he does not require that a commission have any long-term effect, or even have any positive effect at all on public policy, in order to be considered a success (192).  This definition sets the bar rather low, but I don’t consider this a weakness.  As Tama reasonably notes, commissions and panels usually disband long before their recommendations can be fully implemented; it is simply beyond the control of most commissions to influence what happens after their recommendations are either accepted or rejected.5  But his definition of success does help to explain the difference between his findings and those of Zegart and others.  The Crowe Commission formed after the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, for example, counts as a success for Tama, because it led to changes such as increased funding for embassy security (117).  But in a broader sense, as the 9/11 Commission argued, neither the embassy bombings nor the Crowe Commission were enough to change America’s perception of the threat from international terrorism and to prevent the later 9/11 attacks.6         One factor about commissions that I did not see Tama take directly into account is how a commission frames its recommendations.  He notes that commissions are more effective                                                         3 Tama credits the Hart-Rudman Commission for having been one of the first to use the term “homeland security” in American politics (146, note 20).    
4 Pillar writes that the 9/1/ Commission played to emotions and politics, which “would elevate the 9/11 Commission to the top of the pantheon of blue-ribbon panels, whose reports usually serve as little more than doorstops.”  Paul R. Pillar, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform (NY: Columbia University Press, 2011), 236.  Another harsh critique of the way the 9/11 Commission did its work is Philip Shenon, The Commission: An Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation (NY: Twelve, 2008).    
5 An exception might be the 9/11 Commission, whose members continued active as advocates for intelligence and national security reform, with private funding, after the commission officially disbanded.    
6 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (NY: Norton, 2004), 349.   
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when they have a narrow mandate rather than a broad one, and he also points out that some commissions offer long lists of recommendations while others have only a few.  It would be interesting to examine whether or not commissions are more successful—if they can better “sell” their recommendations—if they are able to simplify those recommendations down to only a few.  He quotes William Webster as explaining that one commission lacked influence because “We didn’t have one big recommendation to get people’s attention” (31).  By contrast, the 9/11 Commission may have been successful in part because for many Americans its recommendations boiled down to a few key concepts such as the establishment of a Director of National Intelligence.  How important is it for commissions to be able to offer simple, “bumper sticker” type recommendations, as opposed to long lists of more detailed policy ideas?    One of the most significant contributions of the book may be to add to the literature on 
focusing events: disasters and crises that can stimulate policy change and help organizations and decision-makers learn.  Tama’s discussion of the importance of crises in producing change echoes many of the findings of the focusing event literature, and he cites the work of scholars in this area such as Thomas Birkland.  But he does not specifically link his findings to that literature, and I think it would be useful to set his work in the broader context of focusing events.7
 
  For example, one of the findings in that literature is that crises are most effective in bringing about change and reform when innovations and changes have already been placed on the agenda.  The Hart-Rudman Commission, it seems, may have served this function prior to the 9/11 attacks by placing the idea of a homeland security agency on the shelf, where it could easily be taken down and dusted off when policy makers were looking for changes to make.  This suggests that a question for future research might be whether national security commissions are most effective when they are used to generate support for ideas and policies that are already in play.  Or can they develop and successfully advocate for truly new and innovative policies?   In Terrorism and National Security Reform, Jordan Tama has written an important book that challenges many common understandings in the fields of public policy, national security, and intelligence. 
                                                        7 Tama does discuss the concept of focal points, but not focusing events.   
